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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GLEN D. WARDLE and THORA ] 
WARDLE, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
vs. 
LESTER ROMERO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
| Case No. 950203-CA 
940700002 
Priority No. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(k), Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Was service of summons by publication accomplished for 
an action in rem where the sheriff made 23 attempts to serve 
defendant at his residence, believed defendant to be avoiding 
service of process, and pursuant to court order a copy of summons 
and complaint were mailed to the address designated by the court, 
which address defendant presented to the Davis County Recorder 
and Treasurer for use in tax notices? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion to set aside default under Rules of Civil Procedure 60 (b) 
where defendant had personally examined the District Court file 
which contained the Complaint and Lis Pendens, and thus had 
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actual knowledge of the pendency of the action in March 1994, 
whereas first publication of summons was April 15, 1994, the last 
publication May 6, 1994, and defendant was given thirty days 
after the last publication in which to file an answer? 
3. What is the effect of defendant's failure to file a 
proposed answer setting forth a meritorious defense and the fact 
that a memorandum of the defendant characterized the attempt to 
argue the merits as inappropriate? 
4. Is there merit to defendant's claim that plaintiffs 
failed to exercise reasonable diligence in designating the 
address of defendant where the address given by defendant to the 
County Recorder and County Treasurer was utilized by plaintiff 
and where defendant from time to time designated Airport Motel as 
a return address on envelopes? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
;1." "The district court judge is vested with considerable 
discretion under Rule 60(b) in granting or denying a motion to 
set aside a judgment. State ex. rel. Utah State Department of 
Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983); Airkem 
Intermountain, Inc. V. Parker, 513 P.2d 429 (Utah 1973). The 
court should be generally indulgent toward setting a judgment 
aside where there is reasonable justification or excuse for the 
defendant•s failure to answer and when timely application is 
made. Where there is doubt about whether a default should be set 
asidef that doubt should be resolved in favor of doing so. But, 
before we will interfere with the trial court's exercise of 
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discretionf abuse of that discretion must be clearly shown. 
Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1984). That some 
basis may exist to set aside the default does not require the 
conclusion that the court abused its discretion in refusing to do 
so when facts and circumstances support the refusal. C£. Wilson 
v. Miller, 424 P.2d 271 (Kan. 1967)." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 
92, 93 (Utah 1986). 
The legal standard to be used by trial courts in determining 
whether a defense is meritorious is a question of law which is 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994); Erickson v. Schenkers Intern. Forwarders, 882 P.2d 1147, 
1148 (Utah 1994). The trial court need not reach the question of 
meritorious defense unless it first finds a reason to set aside 
the default under Rule 60 (b) (1), (2), (3), or (4). State by 
and through D. of S. S. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 
1983); Downey State Bank v. Maior-Blakenev Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 
510 (Utah 1976). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
In addition to the rules cited and appended by the 
appellant, the following rules and statutes may be pertinent: 
(a) Rule 4 (g) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: Other 
Service. 
Where the identity or whereabouts of the 
person to be served are unknown and cannot be 
ascertained through reasonable diligence, 
where service upon all of the individual 
parties is impracticable under the 
circumstances, or where there exists good 
cause to believe that the person to be served 
is avoiding service of process, the party 
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seeking service of process may file a motion 
supported by affidavit requesting an order 
allowing service by publication, by mail, or 
by some other means. The supporting 
affidavit shall set forth the efforts made to 
identify, locate or serve the party to be 
servedf or the circumstances which make it 
impracticable to serve all of the individual 
parties. If the motion is granted, the court 
shall order service of process by 
publication, by mail from the clerk of the 
court, by other means or by some combination 
of the above, provided that the means of 
notice employed shall be reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise the interested parties of the 
pendency of the action to the extent 
reasonably possible or practicable. The 
court's order shall also specify the content 
of the process to be served and the event or 
events as of which service shall be deemed 
complete. A copy of the court's order shall 
be served upon the defendant with the process 
specified by the court. 
(b) Rule 8 (c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: Affirmative 
Defenses. 
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively accord and 
satisfaction, arbitration and award, 
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, 
discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, 
failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, 
injury by fellow servant, laches, license, 
payment, release, res judicata, statute of 
frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and 
any other matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense. When a party has 
mistakenly designated a defense as a 
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, 
the court on terms, if justice so requires, 
shall treat the pleadings as if there had 
been a proper designation. 
(c) Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44. Effect of payment, 
acknowledgment, or promise to pay. 
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In any case founded on contract, when any 
part of the principal or interest shall have 
been paid, or an acknowledgment of an 
existing liability, debt or claim, or any 
promise to pay the same, shall have been 
made, an action may be brought within the 
period prescribed for the same after such 
payment, acknowledgment or promise; but such 
acknowledgment or promise must be in writing, 
signed by the party to be charged thereby. 
When a right of action is barred by the 
provisions of any statute, it shall be 
unavailable either as a cause of action or 
ground of defense. 
(d) Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3 Mortgage not deemed a 
conveyance — Foreclosure necessary. 
A mortgage of real property shall not be 
deemed a conveyance, whatever its terms, so 
as to enable the owner of the mortgage to 
recover possession of the real property 
without a foreclosure and sale. 
(e) Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1. Form of action - Judgment -
Special execution. 
There can be one action for the recovery of 
any debt or the enforcement of any right 
secured solely by mortgage upon real estate 
which action must be in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall 
be given adjudging the amount due, with costs 
and disbursements, and the sale of mortgaged 
property, or some part thereof, to satisfy 
said amount and accruing costs, and directing 
the sheriff to proceed and sell the same 
according to the provisions of law relating 
to sales on execution, and a special 
execution or order of sale shall be issued 
for the purpose. 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
AND DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT 
Plaintiffs commenced the action to quiet title against the 
defendant to the home property of plaintiffs in North Salt Lake, 
Davis County, Utah, where the defendant had on May 24, 1993, 
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improperly recorded a quitclaim deed. The quitclaim deed was 
dated March 1, 1960 and held by defendant as security for payment 
of his equity in sale of his interest to plaintiffs. Upon 
defendant's failure to answer after service by publication and 
after having previous knowledge of the filing of the complaint 
and lis pendens, the court received evidence of the title of 
plaintiff and entered a Judgment and Decree Quieting Title In 
Plaintiffs, June 16f 1994. On September 7, 1994, defendant filed 
a motion to set aside the decree. The court reviewed memoranda 
filed by the parties and issued its ruling and order denying the 
motion to set aside the default of the defendant. Defendant 
appealed from the order denying his motion to set aside the 
default. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs do not agree with most of the defendant's 
Statement of Relevant Facts. Most of the relevant facts are 
contained in the record on file in the District Court. No 
transcript of the proceedings has been made. Plaintiffs set 
forth the allegations of the complaint which was filed January 3, 
1994: (Rl) 
1. This is an action to quiet title to 
real property situated at 320 East Center 
Street, North Salt Lake, Davis County, State 
of Utah, and for damages for slander of 
title. 
2. Plaintiffs complain of the Defendant 
who claims some right, title, estate, lien, 
right to possession, or interest in the 
following described tract of land in North 
Salt Lake, Davis County, State of Utah: 
All of Lot 39, Hillside Gardens 
6 
Subdivision, a subdivision of Part of 
Sections 11 and 12f Township 1 Northf 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian. 
3. Plaintiffs are owners absolutely in 
fee simple and are in sole exclusive 
possession of said premises. For more than 
thirty three years last past, the Plaintiffs 
have possessed and paid all taxes assessed 
against said premises since 1960. At no time 
has the Defendant possessed or paid taxes on 
said premises since 1960. 
4. On or about May 24, 1993, the 
Defendant caused to be recorded a Quit Claim 
Deed dated March 1, 1960, wherein Plaintiffs 
are named as grantors and Defendant is named 
as grantee of said premises. Said deed was 
delivered to Defendant at the same time as 
the premises were mortgaged to Defendant, and 
said deed was never intended as a conveyance 
nor intended to be recorded without consent 
of Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs are not 
obligated to the Defendant and the Defendant 
had no right to record said deed or to pursue 
any note, mortgage or claim against the 
Plaintiffs. 
5. By letter dated November 18, 1993, 
the Plaintiff's attorney requested that the 
Defendant quitclaim the property back to 
Plaintiffs to avoid damages. Defendant has 
refused and neglected to remove the cloud 
created by his improper recording of the 
quitclaim deed dated March 1, 1960. Pursuant 
to statute, Utah Code Annotated §§ 38-9-1 and 
38-9-4, Plaintiffs are entitled to $1,000.00 
or for treble actual damages and for 
reasonable attorneys fees and costs because 
the Defendant has wilfully refused to release 
or correct the wrongful recording of the 
quitclaim deed within twenty days from 
November 18, 1993, the date of the letter to 
Defendant requesting the release. 
Plaintiffs recorded a Lis Pendens in the office of the Davis 
County Recorder on January 7, 1994 and filed a copy thereof with 
the clerk of District Court on the same date. (R4) 
A summons and copy of the complaint were delivered to the 
Sheriff of Salt Lake County on January 5, 1994, and the "Return 
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On Process Unserved" dated May 15, 1994, stated that the Sheriff 
was "unable to make contact after several attempts (23)." (R9) 
When the defendant moved to set aside the default by 
claiming that no attempt was made to serve him at his residence, 
6270 Margray Drive, West Jordan, Utah, the affidavit of the 
Sheriff was filed stating the 23 attempts of service were made at 
6270 South Margray Drive. (R64) 
The defendant did not designate the 6270 South Margray Drive 
as being a mailing address in his official communications as 
shown by documents in the record and copied in the addendum to 
this brief. (R 15, 34, 56) 
The Quit-Claim Deed recorded by the defendant on May 24, 
1993 shows an address "c/o Horace Knowlton General Delivery 1760 
W. 2100 S., S.L.C. Ut. 84111" (R15) There was once a practicing 
attorney named Horace Knowlton who died prior to May 24, 1993. 
The 1993 Davis County Tax Notice shows an address as 
follows: 
Romero, Lester c/o Horace Knowlton 
GENERAL DELIVERY 
1760 West 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(R17) 
On November 18, 1993, Thora Wardle paid the taxes on a 
"Duplicate" notice, not having received the original. (R17) 
Romero, on July 20, 1994, mailed to the clerk of the 
district court a message on a form headed "AIRPORT MOTEL 2255 
West North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116, Phone 363-0795" 
containing this handwritten message: 
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Dear Clerk, 
I was at your court in March and found a case 
against me and thought it would be delivered 
to me but as of today I have never been 
served as yet. I have been told sometime a 
person have been served by publication. 
Please look at case and inform me if it shows 
if it has been served 
Case 940700002 
Glen & Thora Wardle 
vs 
Lester Romero 
Reply to (arrow to Lester Romero on prior 
line) 
6270 S 2005 W 
West Jordan Utah 84084 
The notation by the Clerk in response to Romero was: 
"Mailed copy of docket to Lester Romero at address indicated 
above. Case closed, Service by publication. D.M." (R34) 
The handwritten portion by Romero shows that he reviewed the 
file in the Clerk's office in "March" at which time he would have 
seen the Complaint and Lis Pendens. Default of the defendant was 
not taken until June 15, 1994 and entered June 16, 1994. (R28). 
The letter which Romero mailed to George Fadel postmarked 
December 13, 1993 was mailed in an envelope showing a return 
address "AIRPORT MOTEL 6270 S. 2005 W. West Jordan, Utah 84084." 
(R56) Said address of the "Airport Motel" appears to be the 
street address of his residence and a different address of 
"Airport Motel" was shown on the message sent to the Clerk, as 
2255 West North Temple. (R34). 
On April 12, 1994, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Service of 
Process by Publication (R26-27), and the order recited that 
publication be made in the Davis County Clipper and a copy of 
summons and complaint be mailed to the defendant at his last 
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known address: 1760 West 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
(R27) 
The envelope from plaintiffs' counsel addressed to "Mr. 
Lester Romero, 1760 West 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
postmarked April 13, 1994, was stamped "Return to sender" by the 
post office, and other markings made by bold permanent marker 
handwriting on the face of the envelope was "opened in error." 
(R25) Apparently someone had received the letter and opened it. 
Romero claims that said address was the post office address and 
it appears to be the same for his general delivery. 
Also, another envelope from plaintiffs' counsel post marked 
April 12, 1994, addressed "Mr. Lester Romero General Delivery 
1760 West 2100 South Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Important 
Document" was stamped "Return to Sender" "Apr 29" "unclaimed." 
(R24) The record shows that plaintiffs received a Warranty Deed 
recorded March 16, 1960, from Lester Romero and Maxine Romero, 
his wife to said Lot 39 subject to a mortgage recorded August 24, 
1959 in favor of Granite Investment Company in the sum of 
$12,500. 
The property was refinanced by Plaintiffs by mortgage dated 
March 14, 1960 in favor of the Equitable Life Assurance Society 
of the United States in the sum of $14,500.00. (R19 and 21). 
Plaintiffs made the last payment due to Equitable in March 
1980 and received a satisfaction of mortgage April 8, 1980. 
(R23) 
Plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to the motion to set 
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aside default recited that: "No payment or acknowledgment of the 
debt was made after 1980, and the applicable statute of 
limitations is six years." (R52) 
Defendant's reply to plaintiffs' memorandum was Romero's 
affidavit stating "at no time did I allow more than three years 
to go by without receiving a payment from the plaintiffs." (R58) 
Defendant did not file a proposed answer with a statement of an 
affirmative defensef nor did he file a proposed counterclaim for 
foreclosure of the quitclaim deed which he acknowledges was given 
as security. Defendant's said reply memorandum did not indicate 
a meritorious defense and in fact stated "First, plaintiffs' 
attempts to argue the merits of their case is inappropriate 
here." (R58) Romero's affidavit also stated in paragraph 10: 
"There have been disagreements between me and the plaintiffs on 
the amount still due on promissory note for several years." 
(emphasis added). (R43) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Romero had actual notice of the pendency of the action 
before the publication of summons as evidenced by his message to 
the clerk of the court. There were 23 attempts to serve him at 
his residence, and notices were mailed to him at the recent 
address he gave to the county treasurer. Therefore, service of 
process was adequate to apprise him of the pendency of the action 
under Rule 4 (g). Accordingly, the default was properly entered 
by the court and no basis for relief under Rule 60 (b) exists. 
Assuming that for any reason Romero had grounds for relief 
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from default, he failed to plead any meritorious defense to the 
suit to quiet title and in absence thereof, he is not entitled to 
have default and judgment thereon set aside. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. IN THIS ACTION WHERE ONLY IN REM 
RELIEF WA3 GRANTED, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
RULED THAT SERVICE OF PROCESS WAS SUFFICIENT 
UNDER RULE 4(a) "Other Service." 
There was good cause to believe that the defendant was 
avoiding service of process where the sheriff of Salt Lake County 
was unable after 23 attempts between January 13, 1994 and March 
11, 1994 (R64) to serve defendant at his residence, which Romero 
states in his affidavit as being 6270 Margray Drive, West Jordanf 
Utah 84084. (See Appellant's Appendix p. 3f paragraph 14) 
Defendant's counself on page 3 of his memorandum in support 
of the motion to set aside the judgment and decree (R39), 
mistakenly represents: "Defendant was not personally served with 
a summons and complaint and was not aware of this case or the 
judgment until July 21f 1994." This mistake was related to 
Romero's affidavit, paragraph 17 and 18, which stated: 
17. On July 20, 1994, I visited the clerk of 
the court in Davis County to determine what 
additional action, if any, I needed to take 
after recording the quitclaim deed. 
18. At that time, personnel in the clerk's 
office indicated that a case had been filed 
which involved the property. I left a 
written request that the clerk's office send 
me a copy of the docket sheet. 
Apparently, defendant's counsel had not seen the message to 
the clerk written on the Airport Motel message form in which the 
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defendant begins, "I was at your court in March and found a case 
against me and thought it would be delivered to me but as of 
today I have not been served as yet. I have been told sometime a 
person have been served by publication. . . . " (R34) 
The defendant's representation in his affidavit paragraph 17 
and 18 appear to be false in view of the written message on file 
with the clerk. Defendant had actual notice of the complaint and 
Lis Pendens in March 1994, whereas the Motion for Service of 
Process by Publication and Order were filed April 12, 1994. If 
the defendant saw the complaint and lis pendens in March, he may 
also have seen the motion for service by publication in April 
because he makes reference to service by publication. 
The complaint contained a claim for damages and attorneys 
fees for improperly recording the quitclaim deed which may have 
been a reason why the sheriff could not serve Romero personally 
at his residence after 23 attempts. Copies of the summons and 
complaint were mailed April 12, 1994, and April 13, 1994, 
addressed to Romero at the address given by him to the county 
recorder and treasurer. Both envelopes were returned by the post 
office, on marked "opened in error" and the other "unclaimed, 
April 29." 
Plaintiffs' use of Romero's mailing address shown on the 
official records of the Davis County Recorder and the Treasurer, 
to wit: General Delivery, 1760 West 2100 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, appears to be the appropriate mailing address, where 
doubt exists as to which address is the mailing address. In 
13 
Weber v. Snvderville West, 800 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah App. 1990)f 
the trial court determined that there was no adequate explanation 
for the failure to personally serve Snyderville West at its known 
tax address. Jd. at 317. The Court of Appeals stated that while 
the plaintiff had searched telephone directories, motor vehicle 
filings, corporate filings, County Recorder's files and postal 
records, it was apparent "that Snyderville's address was set 
forth in the Summit County tax records pertaining to the very 
property in issue." Jd. at 319. 
POINT II. PLAINTIFFS COMPLIED WITH THE 
REASONABLE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENT OF THE RULE 
FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS BY PUBLICATION. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4(g) "Other Service" is 
primarily to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the 
action. In Downey State Bank v. Maior-blakenev Corp., 545 P.2d 
507 (Utah 1976)f the Utah Supreme Court found reasonable 
diligence where the plaintiff contacted the last registered agent 
of the defendant and obtained a most recent address of the 
defendant assignee, who could not be found by the sheriff at that 
address. Specifically, the court stated: 
It is true that the plaintiff did not exhaust 
all possibilities pointed out by the 
defendant that it appears by hindsight might 
have been used as a means of finding and 
serving him. But that is not what is 
required. The requirement is that there be 
exercised reasonable diligence in good faith. 
On the basis of what has been said above and 
the further facts shown to the trial court 
that Dr. Krofcheck's assignor, Major-Blakeney 
Corporation had ceased doing business in 
Utah, had discontinued its post office box 
address in California, and that there had 
been a bona fide attempt to serve Dr. 
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Krofcheck at the only address known to or 
reasonably obtainable by the plaintiff, the 
court was convinced that the requirement for 
publication of summons has been met. We are 
not persuaded to disagree with that ruling. 
Id. at 509. 
The relevant portions of Rule 4(g) state that 
where there exists good cause to believe that 
the person to be served is avoiding service 
of process, the party seeking service of 
process may file a motion supported by 
affidavit requesting an order allowing 
service by publication, by mail, or by some 
other means. . . . If the motion is granted, 
the court shall order service of process by 
publication, by mail from the clerk of the 
court, by other means, or by some combination 
of the above, provided that the means of 
notice employed shall be reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise the interested parties of the 
pendency of the action to the extent 
reasonably possible or practicable. 
The rule is stated in the alternative and may not require all of 
the stated alternate methods of service, and literally requires 
only notice of pendency of the action. The defendant, Romero, 
had actual knowledge of the pendency of the action in March, 
1994, whereas the order for publication was April 12, 1994. The 
date of the last publication was May 6, 1994, and the time for 
answering commenced on the date of the last publication. (RIO) 
Notwithstanding that defendant's actual notice of the 
pendency of the action precludes his right to have default set 
aside, the plaintiffs properly mailed the summons and complaint 
to his last known current mailing address. The quitclaim deed 
recorded by the defendant shows c/o Horace Knowlton, General 
Delivery, 1760 W. 2100 S. SLC Utah 84111. The defendant's 
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affidavit, paragraph 11, states "I recorded the quitclaim deed on 
May 24, 1993. (emphasis added)" His use of Horace Knowlton's 
name is suggestive of his efforts to avoid being personally 
contacted, although it was known to the trial court that Horace 
Knowlton, an attorney, had been deceased for years prior to the 
recording in 1993. 
The 1993 county treasurer's tax notice (which the courts 
regard as best evidence) shows the address: 
Romero, Lester c/o Horace Knowlton 
General Delivery 
1760 West 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and the envelope sent to that address by plaintiffs' counsel was 
returned "unclaimed" fourteen days after the postmarked date. 
This suggests that defendant was using an address at which he 
could pick and choose which mail to accept. 
In Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court explained the "diligence" requirement where 
defendant does not have actual notice of the pendency of the 
action: 
The second diligence requirement is one we 
imply to avoid constitutional infirmities in 
section 41-12-8. To satisfy it, plaintiff 
must establish that a diligent attempt has 
been made to obtain defendant's current 
address. If a current address is discovered, 
that address is the one to which the mailed 
notice would be sent. Mailed notice to 
defendant's current address clearly satisfies 
Mullane's requirement that the notice be 
reasonably calculated to apprise defendant of 
the pending action. If, despite diligent 
effort, plaintiff is unable to determine 
defendant's current address, then due process 
will be satisfied if notice is mailed to an 
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address that has been determined, after 
diligent efforts, to be defendant's last know 
address, even though it is clear that 
defendant does not presently reside at the 
address. 
We recognize that notice thus mailed to 
a last known address may never reach a 
defendant. However, under appropriate 
circumstances, Mullane permitted not only 
notice mailed to a last known address but 
notice by publication alone. In contrast to 
published process, which is brought to a 
party's attention by "chance alone," notice 
mailed to a last known address has at least a 
chance of reaching a defendant inasmuch as 
either the post office or the current 
resident might forward the mail to defendant. 
We think that in the circumstances presented 
by the normal action to which section 41-12-
8 applies, the mailing of notice to a last 
known address discovered through diligent 
efforts is reasonably calculated to notify 
defendant of the action certainly this form 
of service "is not substantially less likely 
to bring home notice than other of the 
feasible and customary substitutes." 
Id. at 1277 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 
U.S. at 315). 
It is true that plaintiffs' counsel addressed a letter prior 
to commencement of suit to two addresses (R47): 
Mr. Lester Romero 
6270 Margray Drive 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
General Delivery 
1760 WEst 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Neither envelope was returned undelivered. Since Romero was not 
answering the door to the 23 attempts by the sheriff, it was 
thought that the best mailing address of the defendant was the 
one given the recorder and treasurer of Davis County. 
Romero's letter responding to plaintiff's attorney was sent 
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in an envelope showing a return address: AIRPORT MOTEL, 6270 S. 
2005 W. West Jordan, Utah 84084. (R56). 
This now appears to be the same address of the defendant as 
Margray Drive, however, the AIRPORT MOTEL designation did not 
appear to be a residence location. If in fact an AIRPORT MOTEL 
existed (not found in telephone directories), was it at the West 
Jordan address or the address shown for AIRPORT MOTEL on the 
message form defendant sent to the clerk, 2255 West North Temple? 
(R34) 
POINT III. ONE WHO SEEKS TO VACATE A DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT MUST PROFFER SOME DEFENSE AS WOULD 
JUSTIFY A TRIAL OF THE ISSUE THUS RAISED EVEN 
ASSUMING OTHER RULE 60 (b) REQUIREMENTS WERE 
MET. 
The plaintiff's complaint to quiet title recites that "the 
plaintiffs are not obligated to the defendant and the defendant 
had no right to record said deed or to pursue any note, mortgage 
or claim against plaintiffs." No proposed answer or counterclaim 
was filed. In Downey State Bank v. Maior-Blakeney Corp., 545 
P.2d 507 (Utah 1976) the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The other issue to be dealt with is 
defendant's contention that the court abused 
its discretion in refusing to set aside the 
default judgment. A primary difficulty he 
confronts is that, as a general proposition, 
one who seeks to vacate a default judgment 
must proffer some defense of at least 
sufficient ostensible merit as would justify 
a trial of the issue thus raised. As the 
trial court appropriately remarked on this 
point: the defendant failed to proffer any 
meritorious defense, or in fact any defense 
at all. 
Id. at 507. In a more recent case, Erickson v. Schenkers Intern. 
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Forwarders, 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that "the court should only examine the defendant's proposed 
answer and determine whether as a matter of law it contains a 
defense which is entitled to be tried." Id. at 1148 (citing 
Downey, 545 P.2d 507). 
Defendant failed to file an answer or counterclaim and even 
suggested it was inappropriate to discuss the merits. 
Defendant's reply memorandum made reference to Romero's affidavit 
that "at no time did I allow more than three (3) years to go by 
without receiving a payment from the plaintiffs." However, he 
also states: "There have been disagreements between me and the 
plaintiffs on the amount still due on the promissory note for 
several years," and "In addition, the plaintiffs executed a quit 
claim deed on the property which I held as additional security." 
As a matter of law, Utah Code Ann. section 78-40-8 provides: 
A mortgage of real property shall not be 
deemed a conveyance, whatever its terms, so 
as to enable the owner of the mortgage to 
recover possession of the real property 
without a foreclosure and sale. 
A deed given as security is deemed a mortgage. In Hess v. Anger, 
53 Utah 186, 177 P. 232 (1918), the court held: 
In our state a deed absolute in form, 
executed and delivered as a security under a 
parol agreement, and with the understanding 
that it shall be so held, will be construed 
as a mortgage. . . . So, too, a deed, when 
intended as a mortgage, may be given to 
secure an unliquidated claim, or whatever 
indebtedness may thereafter be contemplated 
to be contracted between the parties under it 
and the same foreclosed in a court of equity. 
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Id. at 1300 (cited and followed in Bvbee v. Stuart, 180 P.2d 118 
(Utah 1948). 
If he had acted timely, Romero's remedy was to bring suit 
upon the 1960 promissory note and foreclose the quitclaim deed 
dated March 1, 1960, as a mortgage. On the faces thereof, both 
the note and deed of 1960 would long ago have been barred by the 
statute of limitations. Romero would have had to plead an 
acknowledgment in writing or a payment before expiration of any 
six-year period in order to toll the statute as required by 78-
12-44: 
In any case founded on contract, when any 
part of the principal or interest shall have 
been paid, or an acknowledgment of an 
existing liability, debt or claim, or any 
promise to pay the same, shall have been 
made, an action may be brought within the 
period prescribed for the same after such 
payment, acknowledgment or promise; but such 
acknowledgment or promise must be in writing, 
signed by the party to be charged thereby. 
When a right of action is barred by the 
provisions of any statute, it shall be 
unavailable either as a cause of action or 
ground of defense. 
Justice Wolfe, in Attorney General of Utah v. Pomeroy, 73 
P.2d 1277 (Utah 1937), wrote: 
The next and last question presented by 
appellant for determination is that 
respondents in writing signed by them 
acknowledged the claims sued on. The signed 
acknowledgment claimed is the answer of the 
White Star acknowledging that they owed the 
debt. There is nothing in this contention. 
It is questionable whether the acknowledgment 
in writing, which by section 104-2-45 R.S. 
1933, will extend the period, applies to any 
liability, debt, or claim other than one 
founded on contract, and this obligation to 
pay the tax is not one founded on contract. 
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But even though it need not be an obligation 
founded on contract, the acknowledgment must 
be made before the statute has run and the 
same pleaded to show the tolling of the 
statute, or, if made after the statute has 
run so as to revive the debt as against the 
statute, such acknowledgment must be pleaded 
as a basis of the action. 
Id. at 1300. 
Therefore, Romero, instead of recording the quitclaim deed 
claiming ownership, would have had to plead the note, the deed as 
a mortgage, and the facts which would tell the statute under 78-
12-44 Utah Code Annotated 1953, which is identical to 104-2-45 
R.S. 1933 quoted by Justice Wolfe. 
Romero's recording the deed was wrongful and should have 
rendered him liable to plaintiffs for damages under Section 38-
9-1 and 38-9-4 Utah Code Annotated as pleaded in the complaint if 
he had been personally served. The court specifically stated 
that only "in rem" relief was afforded by the service by 
publication of summons. Since Romero knew by the letter of 
plaintiffs' counsel dated November 18, 1993, that plaintiffs 
would bring suit to quiet title and request punitive damages if 
he failed to execute a quitclaim deed to clear the title of 
record, this, together with his having reviewed the action in 
March 1994, may explain why the sheriff could not affect service 
after 23 attempts. 
Romero's only meritorious defense would be a valid 
counterclaim upon the 1960 note, to be foreclosed based upon the 
1960 deed, which of necessity would have required a pleading 
tolling the statute. This he did not do. His affidavit is an 
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express admission that the deed was a mortgage, that there were 
disagreements between him and plaintiffs on the amount still due 
on the note for several years, and not being able to convince 
plaintiffs to make payments still due, he recorded the deed May 
24, 1993. It is not clear what Romero claims by his statement 
that at no time did he allow more than three years to go by 
without receiving a payment from the plaintiffs. If he in fact 
intended to state that plaintiffs made a payment within three 
years of the filing of the complaint (January 3, 1994) he should 
have stated at a minimum the date and amount of payment, how it 
was credited upon the note as interest on principal and the 
balancef if anyf still due. Nor does he state what action he had 
ever taken if a payment had not been made within three years. He 
never recorded the deed at any previous time during its 33 year 
existence. We should not be required to speculate as to the 
meaning of his ambiguous affidavitf nor should the trial court 
have been required to do so, knowing that the plaintiffs claimed 
to have fully paid by 1980. 
Romero did not file in court copies of any note or other 
evidence of debt or security to which he made reference in his 
affidavit. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs exercised due diligence in attempting to serve 
defendant personally 23 times, and Romero had actual notice of 
the pendency of the action before the publication of the summons. 
Plaintiffs mailed copies of the summons and complaint to 
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defendant at the address defendant gave to the county recorder 
and county treasurer, one copy being returned "opened in error" 
and the other "unclaimed." Therefore, there are no grounds for 
setting aside defendant's default. The judgment of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
1JU _ 
fdeor^e K. B*adel' 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
I certify that I mailed two copies hereof to Mr. Scott 
Lundberg and Mr. William A. Meaders, Attorneys for 
Defendant/Appellant, Lundberg & Meaders, P.O. Box 1290, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84110, this %\ «* day of^pril, 1995^ . 
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FILED IH CLERK'S OFFiCE 
• • #1027 Jan 3 3 * I T M 
G B o n o B K . F A W y i n t . f f B 
A T T O R N E V F O R CLERK. 2UC- D'SI. COURT 
1TO Wwrr F O I R T I I Po« T I I fo 
DoiHTirvi. , lT*H84<HO gy . _ £ ! _ 
Tm.EPMONBa»8»4ai DEnUTYCLCRK 
I N THE SECOND D I S T R I C T COURT I N AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN D. WARDLE and 
THORA WARDLE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LESTER ROMERO, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
C O M P L A I N T 
C i v i l No . W010000Z 
J u d g e 
to.<yi 
1. This is an action to quiet title to real property situated 
at 320 East Center Street, North Salt Lake, Davis County, State of 
Utah, and for damages for slander of title. 
2. Plaintiffs complain of the Defendant who claims some 
right, title, estate, lien, right to possession, or interest in the 
following described tract of land in North Salt Lake, Davis County, 
State of Utah: 
All of Lot 39, Hillside Gardens Subdivision, a 
subdivision of Part of Sections 11 and 12, Township 1 
North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian. 
3. Plaintiffs are owners absolutely in fee simple and are in 
sole exclusive possession of said premises. For more than thirty 
three years last past, the Plaintiffs have possessed and paid all 
taxes assessed against said premises since 1960. At no time has 
, Q50O5O $c 
the Defendant possessed or paid t&xes on said premises since 1960. 
4. On or about May 24
 f 1993, the Defendant caused to be 
recorded a Quit Claim Deed dated March 1, 1960, wherein Plaintiffs 
are named as grantors and Defendant is named as grantee of said 
premises. Said deed was delivered to Defendant at the same time 
as the premises were mortgaged to Defendant, arid said deed was 
never intended as a conveyance nor intended to be recorded without 
consent of Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs are not obligated to the 
Defendant and the Defendant had no right to record said deed or to 
pursue any note, mortgage or claim against the Plaintiffs. 
5. By letter dated November 18, 1993, the Plaintiffs 
attorney requested that the Defendant quitclaim the property back 
to Plaintiffs to avoid damages. Defendant has refused and 
neglected to remove the cloud created by his improper recording of 
the quitclaim deed dated March 1, 1960. Pursuant to statute, Utah 
Code Annotated §§ 38-9-1 and 38-9-4, Plaintiff are entitled to 
$1,000.00 or for treble actual damages and for reasonable attorneys 
fees and costs because the Defendant has wilfully refused to 
release or correct the wrongful recording of the quitclaim deed 
within twenty days from November 18, 1993, the date of the letter 
to Defendant requesting the release. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment: 
1. For a decree of the Court declaring and adjudging that the 
Plaintiffs own absolutely and in fee simple, and are entitled to 
the quiet and peaceful possession of said premises as against the 
Defendant and all persons claiming under him, and that the 
2 
Defendant and all persons claiming by, through or under him have 
no estate, right, title, lien or interest in or to said property 
or any part thereof, and that said title to said property is 
quieted in the Plaintiff against the Defendant and all persons 
claiming under him; 
2. For said decree to permanently enjoin the Defendant and 
all other persons claiming under him from asserting any estate, 
right, title, possession, lien or interest in or to said premises 
adverse to the Plaintiffs or in any way interfering witn 
Plaintiffs' full use and enjoyment of said property; 
3. For damages, costs and a reasonable attorneys fee; and 
4. For such other relief as the Court deems just in the 
premises. 
DATED this 3rd day of January, 1994. 
O^o^ge K/Fadel 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs* Address: 
320 East Center Street 
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN D. WARDLE and 
THORA WARDLEf 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LESTER ROMERO, 
Defendant. 
LIS PENDENS 
Civil No. 940700002 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
NOTICE is hereby given that an action is pending in the above-
entitled cause wherein the Plaintiffs are demanding judgment 
quieting title in the Plaintiffs to the following described tract 
of land in Davis County, State of Utah: 
All of Lot 39, Hillside Gardens Subdivision a Subdivision of 
Part of Section 11 and 12, T 1 North Range 1 West. 
The complaint seeks to set aside all conveyances to the 
Defendant as being null and void for various reasons as recited in 
the complaint. 
DATED this 7th day of January, ,/l^V4. 
>eor«e K/ Fadel 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 7th day of January, 
1994. 
Mj£ Commission E x p i r e s : 
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i V&^EHr/y MrConwjMtonBgDjrtt I 
Novin^b* 25,1906 | 
j 
~tft^x£^A Arxy^UiJJ Q 
I 
Notary Public" 
Davis County, Utah 
. -^ iiii^ - ounOt Utah 
Q 
"*™&Vwmmrmn* on ,he *»*» 
Cronos: K. F A p f . l n J } ^ 7 
ATTORNEY FOR 
1TO WB8T F O l ' R T l t S O I T H 
B o r w T i r i L , U T A H 8 4 0 1 0 
TRLBPHONR aoii-a4ai 
o n t £ f , d a y o f _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
CK ™ 0 N & KEWfMRD 
^er(ff(SaUa,<eCouni"utah 
-Bepnty-
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN D. WARDLE and 
THORA WARDLE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LESTER ROMERO, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
S U M M O N S 
C i v i l No. 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: 
You are hereby summoned and required to file, with the clerk 
of the Second District Court at the Justice Complex, 800 West State 
Street, P.O. Box 769, Farmington, Utah 84025 an answer in writing 
to a complaint filed, in the above-entitled case, and to serve 
upon, or mail to George K. Fadel, Plaintiffs' attorney, at 170 West 
400 South, Bountiful, Utah 84010, a copy of said answer within 
twenty (20) days after service of this summons upon you. 
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint which is 
filed with the Clerk of said court and a copy of which is attached 
hereto and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this 3rd day of January, 
fedel 
;tbrney for Plaintiffs 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
RETURN ON PROCESS 
UNSERVED 
STATE OF UTAH ) • Original 
) ss. SHERIFF'S OFFICE D Amended 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) D Duplicate 
I hereby certify and return that I received the attached ^ / ^ 
on tdate) / - -S^-Ty . 
1. I am returning same unserved: 
D No such address 
D Deceased 
• Return request of • Attorney n Plaintiff o Other 
• Unable to make contact after several attempts (2 3J 
D Need new court date 
o Need employment or daytime address 
• Other 
2. After due search and diligent inquiry, I am unable to locate the within named 
o Defendant a Plaintiff a Other 
D Moved D No forwarding 
o Unknown at given address o Need apartment number 
• Doesn't live at given address 
AARON D. KENNARD. Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Docket # f'^dofCS^T I certify and return that the foregoing 
Processed by ^ / C ^ is true and correct and that this certificate is 
Mileage $ //.Of) executed on (date) i 5 ~ - / 7 - 7 V 
|-dfflNo.5407M0d2 « m » J 
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CLERK, v. PROOF OF PUBLICATION 
Davis County Clipper 
United States of America 
County of Davis, State of Utah, ss: 
\f Ruby Evans _ being duly sworn deposes and 
says that she is the clerk of the DAVIS COUNTY 
CLIPPER, a weekly newspaper published at Boun-
tiful, Davis County, State of Utah. 
That the Notice 
Summons: War<Ue vs , Romero 
a true copy of which is hereto attached, 
published in said newspaper in its issue dated the 
1 5 t h
 day of A P r i l , 19—24, and was published 
in each issue of said newspaper, for_J week(s) 
thereafter, the full period of 4 insertion(s) the 
last publication thereof being in the issue dated the 
6 t h Haynf May ^ ^ 9 4 
Subscribed and sworn to before 
o f May. t AD. 19_2! . 
thk IQ thHay 
iCLkoc*. 
Notafy Public 
Residing at Bountiful 
Commission expires 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
R l t f C C A J A M f f M * 
1370 South 300 Watt 
BountlW.Urari 84010 
My Comnfeafon Exptr* 
Apri 19th, 1998 
STATE OF UTAH 
Fii.Eni'l r.^i?\V ''r---;c 
GEORGE K. FADEL, * } ? * 7 
„ P l a i n t i f f s 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN D. WARDLE and 
THORA WARDLE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LESTER ROMERO, 
Defendant . 
) 
S U M M O N S 
Civil No. °IH ft9 QOUO 2, 
Judge P*a<fr^ 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: 
You are hereby summoned and required to file, with the clerk 
of the Second District Court at the Justice Complex, 800 West State 
Street, P.O. Box 769, Farmington, Utah 84025 an answer in writing 
to a complaint filed, in the above-entitled case, and to serve 
upon, or mail to George K. Fadel, Plaintiffs' attorney, at 170 West 
400 South, Bountiful, Utah 84010, a copy of said answer within 
twenty (20) days after service of this summons upon you. 
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint which is 
filed with the Clerk of said court and a copy of which is attached 
hereto and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this 3rd day of January, 1994. 
jdk 
'j^^t^fafU^f 
ecjtge K. 'Fadel 
^ttorney for P l a i n t i f f s 
/L70 West 400 South 
bountiful, Utah 84010 
F
'LEBIMCLci:*.'c fiF"^ * 
George K. Fadel #1027 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN D. WARDLE and j 
THORA WARDLE, PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR 
) ENTRY OF DEFAULT OF 
Plaintiffs, DEFENDANT AND FOR JUDGMENT 
) BY DEFAULT 
vs. 
) Civil No. 940700002 QT 
LESTER ROMERO, 
) Judge Rodney S. Page 
Defendant. 
Plaintiffs make this application to the above entitled court 
to enter the default of the defendant, Lester Romero, and to 
grant the relief prayed for in Plaintiffs' Complaint quieting 
title in the plaintiffs against the defendant and those claiming 
by, through or under the defendant, and in support hereof the 
plaintiffs represent: 
1. The Complaint was filed on January 3, 1994, and on said 
date plaintiffs deposited an original Summons and copy of Summons 
and Complaint with the Civil Process Division of the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's office to be served upon the defendant, Lester 
Romero. 
2. The deputy sheriff's return of process "unserved" 
recites that he received the Summons on January 5, 1994, and was 
unable to contact the defendant or serve the Summons after 23 
attempts. 
1 
Q 
3. On April 12, 1994, this Court issued an order for 
service by publication in the Davis County Clipper. The first 
publication was on April 15, 1994, and the last publication was 
May 6, 1994. The published summons recited that service of 
summons is complete on the date of the last publication and the 
defendant was granted 30 days in which to answer. Separate 
mailings of the summons and complaint were addressed to Mr. 
Lester Romero, 1760 West 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. The 
one post marked April 12, 1994 was marked "return to sender" on 
April 29, 1994. The one post marked April 13, 1994 was returned 
with a notation, "opened in error." 
4. Plaintiffs request a hearing for the purpose of 
providing the information in support of a decree quieting title 
in the plaintiffs, and upon such hearing that the court enter 
judgment by default in favor of plaintiffs. 
Dated this 0 - day of June, 1994. 
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|W/dm DESCRIPTION 
i i ) 
WW 2 4 WW " -
Recorded at Reqtieit of..;. 
•t M. fee raid | _ .... 
by _._ Dep. Book Fage_ 
Mill tax notice to A<tdfew..%^t:.\r. .^. .X^\iulLlf. iL.^. 
Ktro m wmtaor LESTER 
— ^ 
Ref.t . 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
Glen D# ono Thorn Unrdle 
U?3 Porth l(Hh WMH , Halt Lnkn 
of • County of 
QUiY-CLAlM to 
Lester Horner^ 
grantor 
, State of Utah* hereby 
Xen " DOLLARS, 
tbe following described tract of land In Do v i a 
State of U tah: 
•Ml o<* l o t 3^ H i l l s i d e Gardens S u b d i v i s i o n n 
.'Jvibfilvlon oT port of flections 11 and IP 
Tov/nrhin 1 r'orth Hnnre 1 West flnlt l-oko r'c?rldlnn. 
115 
MAR K119B0 " 
Recorded at Request of. Black's T i t l e and Abstnact Order No. 2566 
at /*?__£ M. Fee raid $_2- ..<?.?. EMH-Y_T,_pi D R E D G E . . ^ U ^ ^ ^ ^ a ^ ^ ^ U ^ ^ ^ t ^ . 
by^<Lt^u-.-^-'-''/jtyu*A~" Hop- »ook. 7 ? ^ . PnRo > 'J' R e f . r ^ ^ u ^ : . 
Mail tax notice to_ 
^ * 
^ 
.Address 
WARRANTY DEED 
LESTER ROMERO and MAXINE ROMERO, his wife, 
of Salt Lake City , County of Salt Lake 
CONVEYS and WARRANTS to 
QLEN D. WARDLE and THORA WARDLE, his wife, 
grantor 8
 f 
State of Utah, hereby 
as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship and not as tenants 
in common 
grantee 
of B o u n t i f u l , Utah for the sum of 
TEN DOLLARS and o t h e r good and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n IXJtOSBSC 
Davis County, 
/ 
the following described tract of land in 
State of Utah: , , , ,. / 
All of Lot 39, HillBide Gardens Subdivision, a subdivision 
of part of Sections 11 and 12, Township 1 North, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Meridian; 
SUBJECT TO a mortgage executed by the grantor herein 
in favor of GRANITE INVESTMENT COMPANY in the original 
amount of $12,500.00, recorded August 24, 1959 in 
Book 169, page 622 as Entry No. 192966, office of the 
County Recorder of Davis County, Utah, which said 
Mortgage the grantees herein hereby assume and agree 
to pay. 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this 
March , A. D. I9 6 0 . 
clay of 
Signed in the Presence of 
-^H 
P 
CL 
,£BtST 
STATE OF UTAH, 
199° Ui i viS 
Make Check Payable To; 
Ml 
,oxC>18 
yhgkm. Utah 84025 
Anmn THIS POfttlON MltM YOUR HAIL FAYMEH?. Your cancelled chaiik Will be 
your receipt. U • vafldfttod receipt r» d»«r»d rMum the enttre tax f \ 
notice and a stampfcd, Mff addressed envelop* wHh your payment. ] 
Payment of property taxes may be made with check or money order In U.S. exchange only. 
If check or money order is returned by financial Institution as not belnfl honored** 
payment will be cancelled without notice to property owner. | t 
> COUNTY T \ 
t : .PAWS COUNTY TftBA?ji 
^X NOTICE 
RE SURER 
vt nmmntimmri tnmn (801)431 3243 
00566558 
* DUPLICATE * 
(45) 0 l ! l l l s 0 0 3 9 
ROMERO, LESTER X HORACE KNOWLTON ' 
GENERAL DELIVERY 
1760 WEST 2100 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Tnx District # !
 o A S Serial * t Q, f i i 1 < 0 0 3 9 
1993 BALANCE DUE • » 83.06 
RHAIW THIS f>c&ncj?! ro» ynun nrrrmns 
T r n p e r t y D e s c r i p t i o n ( n o t for l e o a t d o c u m e n t * ) 
ALL OF LOt 5 9 , HILLSIDE GARDENS. CONT. 0 * 2 9 u CRfcS. 
rroperty Addrti i . 92 SOUTH 3 0 0 EAST NORTH SALT LA1& * DUPLICATE * 
,Valtie of Property JUL Distribution of General Taxes 
Type taxable Value Market Value £ff. tiul RalJ Taxing Unit [tax Rate Amdutit 
RES. LAND 
RES. IMPROV 
12,280 
33 ,710 
18,334 
50,334 
006915 
001556 
001585 
000532 
.000261 
000125 
000052 
.000341 
000392 
.000035 
000335 
SCHOOL DISTRICT 
DAVIS COUNTY 
N.S.L CITY 
COUNTY BOND frUND 
COUNTY LIBRARY 
WEBER WATER DtSf. 
Mosquito ABATEMENT 
SO.DAVIS WATER DlSf 
SO. DAVIS SEWER DSf 
N.S.L WATER DtST. 
STATE ASSESS & COLL 
.010325 
L002326 
002367 
000795 
1.000389 
1000187 
000071 
.000309 
000586 
-000032 
1.000500 
474.85 
106.97 
108.86 
36.56 
17.89 
6 
3 
60 
59 
23.41 
26.95 
2.39 
22.99 
45,990 68,668 ,012132 .018114 833.06 
Delinquent Information 
1 nxes nrc Delinquent at 5:(Hl P. M. Nov. 30, 1993 
SUte «t»tut» prevents the County Treasurer from accepting payment 
of c«rr»nt years taxes between DEC. I AND DEC 15. Payments 
received Between DEC. 15, 1993 in* JAN. 15, 1994 most Include a 
? recent or 110.00 penalty, whichever Is greater.After JAN. 15, 1994, 
Interest Is charged from JAN. 1, 1994 at the rate defined 
by state statute 59-M331. 
Adjustments To Taxes 
CIRCUIT BREAKER ABATEMENT 
INDIGENT ABATEMENT 
$50.00-
$300.00-
Total Adjustments : 
Total General Taxes 
Tolftl Payrriehts : 
ifyi tftx Balance btlft! 
M e • 
SeMll # i 
t e n tftMpflfty 
. »U.mfr»ntl.itrm.mii 
ROMERO, LtSfftR 
0 U 1 1 H 0 0 3 9 ( 
I HORACE 
45) 
RUO 
l xil.i. e to receive tax notice does not excuse penalty or Interest, this of Mel II Mt HIpAhltHl It yd* »4y tlxes M Mplrty Itttf tlltn row own, Newly 
rur<M<M property Is the tax responsibility of the buyer. If this proMrtf Mt llooMo'tJ » cottlnlo, ItMf itllndtteAtlls Itf apply which M Mt appear MI 
this nniir.. M,i,e check payable to DAVIS COUNTY MEASURER and return to lot III, ^MMlMtAN, OtAll IIMI. H>«lntt MM by l i l t t«it at MSttMHtD 
no Inter than Nov. 30, 1993. Our office hour* tr« Mem W fl:»S:00. Jfeift (MM filly be pW ft yfct toUl Mnlfttfiy 
*m*LMk^+*+* 
W 
V OWNP.R'S POLICY Order No. 2566 
Kansas City Title Insurance Company 
< A S T O C K C O M P A N Y * 
No.O-UB- Kansas City, Missouri 
9 21) AMOUNT $ 1 9 , 9 5 0 . 0 0 
tMjto Jpolitp of (Ci(le JncNirnitrc WUntMtth, n.:.i KANSAS CI IY TITLE INSUMANCT. 
C O M P A N Y , lu ' icin tn l lcd (lie C '" in | ' ; tm. in coosidcr.-ttiou of (lie payment of the p r e m i u m for ll i i< Policy, <l«>cs 
lu-rd>y cmri.anf ;m<l ;»f.ri-c ilwi it will psiy to GLEN D. WARDLE a n d THORA WARDLE. >><« wl f > 
l iciTinnficr ciilled tlic Insured, I IK" liciir. devisees, or personal representatives of the Insured, al l loss or damnR" I » « I 
exceeding 
NINETEEN THOUSAND MINK HUNDRED FJPTY AND 1 1 0 / 1 0 0 Dolbrs. 
(S ih ich thev, or any ol them sii.ill sustain Jn tendon of * 19,950.00 ). «-i _ . 
itlc of the Insured to the estate <»t interest of the Insutcd in the teal estate clcsctil>ccl under 
defect or defects in the 
Schedule A , hereto 
annexed, or In tcason of liens or cncumbianccs against the same as of the date of the f ina l examinat ion of the tit le 
thereto, to wit: March 2 1 , 1?6() a t k :05 P.M. 
which date shall he deemed the effective date of this Policy, excepting the defect*, estates, interests, objections, l ien* 
or cnctimhranccs ment ioned in Schedule H. hereto annexed, or excepted by the conditions or stipulation*; of this Pol-
icy hereto annexed and incorporated l u t e i n as a part of this contract. A n y loss hereunder shall \JV established find 
the amount thereof ascertained in the manner provided in said conditions and stipulations and l*e payable upon 
compliance vvith the provisions of same and not otherwise. 
Jin W i l l i e * * WUjtrcof , K A N S A S C I I V H U P I N S U R A N C E C O M P A N Y has caused its corporate sea! to !>c 
hereto af f ixed and these present* to be signed by its du ly authorized officers in facsimile to become effective as its 
original seal and signatures and b ind ing on the company as of the day and date countersigned by its designated 
home off ice authori ty or bv its d o b authorized agent, whose identity as authent icat ing signatory is Subjoined hereto 
for reference and whose authori ty is guaranteed as of such date, all in accordance w i t h its by-laws. 
KANSAS CITV TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY 
Local Ser i ice Unit: ,. * rv • — 
BLACKS T1TIT, AND ABSTRACT COMPANY 17 ; 
429 West 5th South / v v \ 
Bountiful, Utah £ r ' 
Phone AXtell 5-5528 
Validating Signatory: 
Merrill L. Black 
Countersigned and validated this 2 1 s . t day of .....March... 
.JP.»..M. (Here insert date of Special Counsel's final certificate of title.) 
Secretary 
., !9. .6 .0 , at .4:05-o'clock 
Authorized Signatory. 
SCHEDULE A 
I. The estate of the Insured in the real estate described below covered by this Policy is 
FEE SIMPLE TITLE 
2. T h e deed or other means by w h i c h the estate or interest covered 
is described as fol lows: 
Insured 
(Li 
d 
i l l 
SCHEDULE B 
This Policy does not insure or indemnify against the estates, interest, defects, objections to title, liens, charges 
ant! cticnmbratices affecting said real estate, or the estate or interest therein insured, as are scheduled below: 
1. The title to appliances installed on deferred payments whether attached to or otherwise used in connection 
with the premises hereby insured. .. 
2. Rights of parties in actual possession of all or any part o f the premises other than the Insured. 
3. Mechanics' and materialmen's liens not of record at the effective dale of this Policy. 
•1. Any discrepancies, conflicts, cncioachmcnts, or shortages in area and boundaries which a correct survey 
would show. 
now accru ing as a l i e n , not yet due. 5. Taxes f o r the year i960 
6. Said proper ty i s included wi th in the boundar ies of t h e Weber 
Basin Water Conservancy D i s t r i c t ; the Davis County Mosquito Abate-
ment D i s t r i c t ; t h e Bonnevi l le I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t ; South Davis 
County V/ater Improvement, D i s t r i c t ; and the South Davis County Sewer 
Improvement D i s t r i c t , and i s s u b j e c t t o any assessments which may 
h e r e a f t e r accrue in t h e i r favor* 
7 . Subject t o t h e P r o t e c t i v e Covenants a f f e c t i n g H i l l s i d e Gardens 
Subd iv i s ion , d-ited January 25, 1956, executed by Mary Godbe Gibbs, 
e t a l f recorded February ?J\ f 1956 in Of f ic ia l Records, Book 1 0 1 , 
Vnpre 157, Entry No. 1 5 U 9 1 . 
£• A Mortgage datnd March H , I960, executed by Glen D. Wardle 
and Thora W a n l e , h i s wifn, r iven to secure t he payment of a c e r t a i n 
promissory no to of even da te t h e r e w i t h , in the p r i n c i p a l sum of 
.. 1/*, 5^0.00, payable t o g e t h e r with i n t e r e s t as t h e r e i n provided, in 
h ivor of THE K'jlHTAHLK'UFK A.iSURAIiCE SUCIBITY OF THE UNITED STATES, 
a c o r p o r a t i o n , recorded Inarch 16, i960 in O f f i c i a l Records, Book 
J"/,, ' a g e 116, Entry No- 201292. 
Form O 10—Revised 5-40 \H 
L H j L C M t i l V U • » • ! * m p*«Mt mt »JL*«H t-im a.w«fci.%rn v i t o t l u u r i 
T H E E Q U I T A B L E LITE A S S U R A N C E S O C I E T Y 
O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S 
H O M E o r F I C E NEV^ YORK I. NEW Y O n K 
tyr/ Glen D. Wardlr 
320 East Center S t r e e t 
Bount i fu l , Utah 
G. A. B A K E f l . CASMitn 
€oe nwsT stcuwitr BLOO. 
*03 SO. MAIN ST. 
r. O. BOX 1SOO. SALT LAKE CITY tO. UTAM 
March 16, i960 
TV'-ir Mr. Wardle: loan Number 151002 
The closing of your Equitable lonn provides an opportunity to congratulate you on 
your decision to assure the purchase of your home for your family. 
Installment payments are clue on the first of each month. It is to your advantage 
to make payments promptly since in this mariner the portion of each installment 
applied to loan principal increases and the portion applied to interest decreases 
enrh month. 
While monthly notices or receipts are not furnished, you will receive an annual 
statement of the amounts applied during the calendar year to principal, interest 
nnd insurance premiums, and the balance of unpaid principal. Shortly after the 
due date of the first monthly loan installment our Home Office will send you a 
set of remittance advices (one to accompany each remittance), a supply of enve-
lopes and a wallet for your convenience in maintaining remittance records, 
the meantime we are enclosing several self-addressed envelopes for your use 
making payments prior to receipt of this packet. 
Taxes and fire insurance premiums should be paid directly by you. Your fire in-
surance broker should be instructed to forward the original renewal policy to 
this office at least 5 days prior to the expiration of any fire insurance policy, 
•»rd to send you a copy of the policy with a bill for the premium. 
Yours very truly, 
Cashier 
Due "Insurance Fremium $ 
!)UP 60-^-1 Monthly Installment $1^1.2Z 
Irregular Interest from 60-3-1? to 60-U-l \\t)\$2 $ 192.1|9 
Pue W-o-J and each succeeding month $ 151*97 
Eur, 
T I IF EQUIl ABU LUE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES 
UO Montgomery 51 , Stiilr 7r>l). Snn I rn»< isc;o. Cflltfnrnta 94104 (415) .197 IIROO 
RIAL I SI Aft O H RAI IONS - MANACfMfNI DMWRIMt-'NT 
WISH RN RK.IONAI Sf RVKT ( I N l fR 
IARRY O nURNFII . ( M l . 11 Ml 
M.innqpf 
Mr. Glen J). Wardle Mirch 1 3 , 1980 
320 E. C e n t e r S t r e e t 
N. S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
Ret II l.onn No. 403 516 
Dear Mr. W a r d l e : 
C o n g r a t u l a t i o n s I The I n s t payment due* u n d e r your mortgARe If* t h a t payment due 
A p r i l 1 , 1980 . Our r e c o r d s I n d i c a t e i t w i l l he fo r an amount of $ 8 9 . 0 6 . 
P l e a s e use t h i s l e t t e r a s your o f f i c i a l n o t i f i c a t i o n of f i n a l payment d u e . 
P l e a s e be a s s u r e d t h a t we a p p r e c i a t e d your b u s i n e s s and i f you have any q u e s t i o n s 
i n r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s l e t t e r , p l e a s e l e t us h e a r from you . 
S i n c e r e l y , \ 
\ 
P. J. R*WU N 
Assistant Manager - Servicing 
P.IR/ir 
Enclosure 
TI IE EQUITABLE urE ASSURANCE SOCIE I Y OF THE UNITED STATES 
120 Montgomery St, Suite 750, San Tranclsco, California 94104 (415) 397-0800 
RE AIT Y OPERATIONS AREA - MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT 
WESURN REGIONAL SERVICE CENTER 
Gltn P. Wandtt 
HO E<ut Ctntt\ St. 
Bounfifrtt, Utah 
ApftLi i , i "iI'll 
Loan Mo-? 403 " 
JJOAdltt 
Wt OAt pltahtd to tnctoAt tht fallov&Ln > i sammtA A ign I" fating tht e'j LC 
ntpaymtnt o$ yotui mohJtgagt* 
f CAGE 3. RELtASl -}UCV u 
Tht Satisfaction o$ Mottgagt Ahould bt taktn promptly to the. County 
CltAk far fitcoiding thtntky MttnAing tht Iqultablt'A intvttht in tht 
pfiopvity* 
A copy cfs thii tttttA ha* bttn phovidtd fan I/I HI tlgnatuAt athnoutltjdgJlng 
Ktatlpt o$ tht doctmtntA. VltaAt tittivw if In Cftf htamptd Atli-addKtAktA 
tnvttopt tncJLoitd ^0* youn zonvinitnct. 
Congratulation* on \taahk\q fJti* itgnlittant mlitAtontl We appKteMvtt 
you* having choAtn tht EqulXabtt a* you* moKtgagtt and fan giving at tht 
opportunity to Atnvlct you* loan. 
1^ you havt qutitJLonh titgaftxHng any intouian&t you may havt ptiuthaitd fa*, 
montgaqt ptottitlon, pltaht contact youA tquttablt agtnt OK nvvitht 
Equitabtt o^lct. 
StnttAtlyp 
LVBtJC L. V. ttunnttt, 
EnoJtt HanagtA 
f aoJinowttdgtdt 
Volt* " 
$ignahi\t 
RtmindtM Havt tht Sail* faction o< Uoitgagt Mtohdid imtdJMtly u a 
Atnvitt will bt mht iok tht pitpaAatlon o& a dupll&att. 
1 fl&\ 
ll>uiiMMr 
«V 
IM?R> D BURNEII, CIU. I I M I 
M.itiAerr 
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GEORGE K. F A D E L 
ATTOINIT AT LAW 
RocK*lfAmm 
170 W»»» 400 swrrm Bouimwu CTAM B40IO 
'
x
^ ^ | 
'er 
Lanob\N^on 1890s 
23 
p PM 
3 . /a - a 
Mr. Lester Romero 
1760 West 2100 South \ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84Vll 
«v 
o\i\o 
•33 
CD 
Co 
GEORGE K. F A I ^ j ^ i f
 f 
ATTORNEY FOR 
tTO WEST F O U R T H S O U T H 
B O I N T I F I L , U T A H 84010 
TBLEPHONE »o»-»42i 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN D. WARDLE and ) 
THORA WARDLE, 
) MOTION FOR SERVICE 
Plaintiffs, OF PROCESS BY PUBLICATION AND 
) ORDER 
vs • 
) Civil No. 940700002 
LESTER ROMERO, | Judge Rodney S. Page 
Defendant. 
On January 3, 1994, George K. Fadel, attorney for 
plaintiffs, deposited a Summons and Complaint with the Civil 
Process Division of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office to be 
served upon Lester Romero, defendant. Having expended 
significant effort, the Salt Lake County Sheriff has been unable 
to serve process upon Romero. Since January 13, 1994, Officer 
Jack Hill of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department has 
attempted to serve Romero at his residence twenty-three times. 
Officer Hill has had prior dealings with Romero and believes that 
Romero recognizes Officer Hill and is intentionally avoiding 
service of process. Officer Hill believes that Romero has been 
home but has refused to answer his door. Additionally, Officer 
Hill has sent Officer Ron Jensen to attempt service of process. 
FiLcH \%\ r>' ?TV: : 
Jim N 10 26 iiiS ' M 
PY. 
DE"U1 ' • ! • ' [ \\K 
1 
Officer Jensen's efforts were equals '•• productive. 
Having exhausted other service of process methods, 
plaintiffs pray for an order authorizing service of process upon 
defendan s
 UOunty Clipper, a 
newspaper of general circulation in Davis Countyf Utah. 
/ 
1994. 
Jteorge J& Fadel 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Sworn to and subscribed before me this /A das of April, 
C^IXJJX l(J(9&JU 
ntifui Residing at Bou tii 
My Commission expires: 
ORDER 
foregoing motion and good cause appearing 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that service of process upon 
I c ' . i i ' i Mi iiiif i I made by publicatior '••* summons in the Davis 
County Clipper, Bountiful, Utai : : :i : f : • ,„: 
successive weeks, and by mailing •• ~he defendant a copy of 
±ab>L Kuuwii address: 1760 West 2100 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah AIII. 
Dated this \2**- day of April, 1994. 
By the L 
Distric 
ENVELOPE USED BY DEFENDANT IN 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL 
-* 0> > 
C M ; O S * 
s> S o 
op § m 
2 
^ <£? • * * > 
£ <Tk 
DEFENDANT'S MESSAGE TO CLERK 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
PAV!$ fVii.JHT''. :(i i n 
JUL 20 2 3sPH fM 
LERK. 2Jr. -j : ! C 
•€*ffT(TtERI 
C RK^<„ ^;.l OURT 
rr. 
AIRPDRT MOTEL 
2 2 5 5 WEST NORTH TEMPLE • SALT LAK TY, U T * ^116 • PHONE 3 6 3 - D 7 9 5 
# 
S S A~G RELJELl^X 
T O 
r 
L 
i 
_j 
DATE 
D A T 
*£r f^ 
a* 
:± 
BY 
fprm N-R73* The Drowing Boord, lr,t , Box 505, Dallas, Texas 
I N S T R U C T I O N S TO S E N O t P : 
I . KEEP YELLOW COPY. 2 . SCNO WHITE A N D P INK C O P I E S WITH CARBON INTACT. 
VfcsfSovA ^ S I 
I N S T R U C T I O N S TO R C C t l V C H : 
WRITE R t P L Y . 2. DETACH STUB. KEEP P INK COPY, R E T U R N W H l r t COPY TO SCNC)f 
(^J^uAjb Uufr 3\ 
